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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ects of nancing constraints on employment decisions of
rms, when it is possible to choose between permanent and xed-term workers. We use
linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms in Portugal, and
the 2008-09 nancial crisis as a shock for identication. We nd that rms in sectors that
intrinsically rely more on external nance increased the share of xed-term employment and
hires after the crisis, while the e¤ect for rms with wider access to buyer-supplier credit
is relatively lower. At the worker level, workers in sectors that require signicant external
nancing are more likely to be hired with a xed-term contract after the crisis, while those
in sectors that have wider access to supplier credit are less likely. Our results suggest that
the crisis induced nancially constrained rms to use the more exible xed-term contracts
more intensively. Credit from suppliers alleviated this e¤ect by potentially providing an
alternative source of funds to credit from nancial institutions.
Key Words: Financial crisis, Credit constraints, Employment, Fixed-term Contracts
JEL Classication Numbers: J2, J41, G20, M51
This research was partially funded by the European Union FEDER Programme, and by Fundação
para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, project EXPL/IIM-ECO/1207/2013. We are grateful to conference
participants at the SOLEnEALE 2015 Meetings and at the ESPE 2015 conference for discussions and
comments.
yEmail: a.p.o.fernandes@exeter.ac.uk.
zEmail: priscila@eeg.uminho.pt.
1
1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis of 2008-09 has sparked renewed interest, both in academic and
policy circles, in understanding the cyclicality of employment and, in particular, the link
between nancial constraints and credit availability and employment. Recent research has
shown that nancing constraints a¤ect rm level employment decisions (Benmelech et al.,
2011) and, in particular, that rms that borrowed from weaker banks or that tightened
debt capacity in the period preceding the recent crisis, experienced a signicantly larger
fall in employment in the aftermath of the nancial crisis (see Giroud and Mueller, 2015;
Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Greenstone et al., 2014, for evidence on the US, and Bentolila et
al., 2013, for evidence on Spain).1
This paper investigates how the nancial crisis of 2008-09, and the resulting nancing
constraints imposed on rms, a¤ect rmsdecisions in terms of employment composition,
when it is possible to choose between temporary and permanent contracts when hiring a
worker. This question has received signicantly less attention from researchers. Labour
market responses to the crisis have been larger in European labor markets, characterized
by strict employment protection legislation for regular contracts and by a dual struc-
ture, where exible temporary contracts coexist with the protected permanent contracts.
However, evidence on the e¤ects of nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent
crisis, on rmsdecisions regarding the composition of employment and the mix between
temporary and permanent workers is limited.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers
in Portugal, and exploit the 2008-09 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to study the
link between nancing constraints and the intensity of xed-term workers within rms.
We also estimate, at the worker level, how nancing constraints a¤ect the probability of
being hired with a temporary contract after the crisis. Our results complement those in
Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who show evidence from survey data for Italy, that rms that
self declare as nancially constrained have higher shares of xed-term workers.
Understanding the e¤ects of nancial constraints on temporary employment following
the crisis is of importance given existing evidence that the increased use of xed-term con-
tracts, which have lower ring costs, has several adverse e¤ects. These include increased
employment volatility, lower wages of temporary workers, as unions tend to protect the
interests of permanent workers in the wage bargaining, and lower labour mobility due to
1Exploiting di¤erential nancing needs across sectors, Siemer (2014) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015)
show consistent evidence for rms in more nancially dependent sectors in the US.
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higher uncertainty. Moreover, the increase in worker turnover rates may negatively a¤ect
investment in rm-specic human capital and rmsprovision of training, with potential
negative e¤ects on labour productivity (see e.g., Dolado et al., 2002 and Fialho, 2014).
Our ndings of increased intensity of xed-term employment and hires after the crisis,
particularly for rms with higher dependence on external nance, suggest that increased
uncertainty following the shock has led rms to increase the use of temporary employment
contracts as a way to increase exibility and save in future ring costs. This is particularly
relevant in European labor markets where permanent workers are highly protected while
temporary contracts have mild dismissal regulations. These results have important policy
implications and are suggestive of potential long-term e¤ects of the crisis with increasingly
segmented labour markets, higher exposure to labor market frictions and decrease in the
accumulation of human capital, as temporary workers often go through repeated spells
of unemployment.
In addition to the availability of employer-employee data, Portugal o¤ers a good set-
ting to study the use of xed-term contracts, as they represent a signicant share of total
employment, averaging 15 percent over the period, one of the largest in the EU. The
average share of xed-term hires was above 50 percent over the period. Similar to other
European countries, workers with open-end contracts are highly protected against indi-
vidual dismissal, but specic to the Portuguese labour market is the fact that employment
protection regulation is weaker for temporary employment than in other EU countries.2
The linked employer-employee data (LEED) that we use has unusually detailed informa-
tion, including the workersgender, age, education, occupation, and importantly for this
study, the type of contract of employment, whether xed-term or open-ended, as well as
the hiring date in the rm, hours of work and earnings. Information for rms includes
total sales, total employment, industry, location, number of establishments, legal and
ownership structure.
We use industry-level measures of external nancial dependence, access to buyer-
supplier credit and asset tangibility, following the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998),
Braun (2003) and Fisman and Love (2007), to identify credit supply e¤ects. These meas-
ures are computed from rmsbalance sheet data over the period that precedes the crisis,
to avoid changes in rm behavior after the crisis to a¤ect the sector measures of nancial
vulnerability, and are merged with the LEE data. As discussed in Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and Braun (2003), technological di¤erences across industries in their dependence
2Legislation on dismissals and xed-term contracts was not changed during the sample period. See
Varejão and Portugal (2009) for a study of the use of xed-term contracts in Portugal.
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on external nance or asset tangibility reect intrinsic properties of the sectors and persist
across countries and time.3 By exploiting cross-industry di¤erences in external nancial
needs, which are intrinsic characteristics of an industry and, as such, exogenously determ-
ined from the perspective of individual rms, we circumvent the di¢ culty in this type of
studies, of disentangling supply-side from demand-side changes in the credit market in
response to the crisis.4 We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erence identication strategy, and
estimate di¤erences in the use of temporary employment contracts for rms in industries
with intrinsically higher dependence on external nance, or lower access to trade credit,
relative to rms in industries with lower nancial vulnerability, after the nancial crisis,
controlling for rm characteristics.
We start by estimating the e¤ect of the crisis on employment within rms and sec-
tors, and nd that the crisis is associated with negative e¤ects on employment and with
increased employment volatility. The overall employment e¤ects are not signicantly dif-
ferent for rms in sectors with higher dependence on external nance or lower access to
trade credit. Our main results, on the e¤ects of nancial constraints on the intensity of
xed-term employment contracts following the shock, show that rms in industries with
higher dependence on external nance increased the share of xed-term employment, rel-
ative to rms with lower external nancial needs after the 2008-09 crisis. We account for
rmsunobserved characteristics, which absorb any systematic di¤erences across rms
with di¤erent degrees of nancial dependence, and for aggregate trends.
These ndings suggest that as a result of nancing constraints and increased uncer-
tainty, rms increased demand for the more exible temporary workers after the crisis,
particularly those in more nancially dependent sectors. Interestingly, rms in sectors
with intrinsically higher access to buyer-supplier credit exhibit relatively lower shares of
xed-term employment and hires, relative to other rms, after the crisis. This suggests
that implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit may have provided an alternative
source of funds to credit from nancial institutions during the crisis (see Fisman and
Love, 2003) and alleviated the need to use temporary workers, which potentially have
lower productivity (Caggese and Cuñat, 2008). Results are consistent when we dene
our dependent variable as the share of workers hired with a xed-term contract in total
3Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun (2003) argue that the measures capture sectors innate tech-
nological properties, and vary signicantly more across sectors than across rms within an industry, or
over time. These measures have been extensively used, e.g. by Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) to study
the e¤ects of the global crisis, and by Manova (2013) to study credit constraints and international trade,
amongst others.
4A similar approach was followed by Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) and Siemer (2014), amongst others.
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hires within rms, indicating that rms in more nancially vulnerable sectors increased
the share of hires with temporary contracts after the crisis, relative to rms with lower
external nancial needs.
We then estimate worker-level specications for the likelihood of being hired with a
xed-term contract, for the sample of workers hired by rms over the period. We nd
that after the crisis, workers are more likely to be hired with a temporary contract if
employed by rms in sectors with high dependence on external nance, but less likely
if hired by rms in industries with higher access to credit from suppliers, controlling for
workersobservable and unobservable characteristics.
Since we use the share of xed-term workers in total employment, and estimate di¤er-
ential e¤ects for rms based on external nancial dependence of their sector, computed
prior to the crisis, our methodology alleviates identication concerns (in studies of the
e¤ect of nancial constraints on employment, in particular) that measures of nance
availability may be correlated with demand for the rmsgoods and hence their demand
for labor. To provide an additional test of our identication, we use the 2001 crisis that
originated in the ICT sector, and nd no statistically signicant e¤ects on temporary em-
ployment contracts. Our results based on quasi-natural experimental evidence are thus
consistent with the role of nancial constraints on the intensity of xed-term employment
within rms.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. In
Section 3 we describe the data used, the construction of the main variables and the
empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the quasi-natural experiment and discusses the
results. The last section concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to a recent literature that has studied the e¤ects of nancial con-
straints on employment decisions of rms with di¤erent degrees of exposure to a nancial
shock. Chodorow-Reich (2014), uses employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) and the borrowing history of rms that accessed the syndicated loan mar-
ket, to study the e¤ect of bank lending frictions during the 2008-09 crisis on employment.
The author nds that rms that had borrowed from less healthy nancial institutions
before the crisis had lower probability of obtaining a loan after the crisis and reduced em-
ployment by more, relative to rms that borrowed from healthier lenders before the crisis.
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Greenstone Mas and Nguyen (2014) show consistently that the withdrawal of lending to
small rms accounted for statistically signicant negative e¤ects on county employment
during the recession. These results are consistent with a literature that emphasizes that
smaller rms are likely to be more vulnerable to credit supply constraints due to larger
asymmetric information, and less transparency (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
Using a similar approach, but focusing on Spain, Bentolila et al. (2013) study employ-
ment changes from 2006 to 2010 for rms that obtained a signicant share of funding from
banks in Spain that were bailed out by the government as a result of the nancial crisis,
relative to rms that borrowed from healthier banks. The authors nd that rms that
borrowed from weak banks su¤ered a signicantly larger fall in employment. Benmelech
et al. (2011) exploit variation in the amount of maturing debt, bank deregulation in the
U.S., and the contraction of loans made by Japanese a¢ liate banks in the U.S. during the
1990s as quasi-experiments. They show that labor is sensitive to nancial constraints
and that the provision of bank credit a¤ects unemployment, suggesting that nance plays
an important role in rm-level employment decisions.
Giroud and Mueller (2015) use establishment-level data for the U.S. to study the
relation between changes in house prices and changes in employment during the recession.
The authors split samples based on median values in rm leverage (debt over assets)
change between 2002 and 2006, and show that high-leverage rms (which tightened
debt capacity in the period preceding the crisis) had signicantly larger employment
declines in response to household demand shocks than low-leverage rms(which freed
up debt capacity). They also show that all job losses resultant from falling house prices
are concentrated among high-leverage rms.
Siemer (2014) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) rely on an identication strategy
similar to that employed in this paper, exploiting di¤erences across sectors in external
nance dependence. Siemer (2014) uses a measure of nancial external dependence across
sectors, and employment data from the BLS and nds that small and young rms in
sectors with high dependence on external nance had lower employment growth than
rms in sectors with low dependence on external nance, as a result of the 2008 recession.
The author also develops a heterogeneous rm model with endogenous rm entry and
nancial constraints to study the e¤ect of a nancial shock on small and young rms.
Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) also use BLS data and exploit industry-level external nancial
dependence (the proportion of capital expenditures nanced with external funds) to study
transitions from employment to unemployment at the worker-level. They nd that the
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probability of becoming unemployed during the nancial crisis is larger for workers in
industries with high external nance dependence relative to those in industries with low
dependence on external nance.
Di¤erent from these studies, which all focus on total employment e¤ects of the crisis,
we study how the crisis a¤ected the relative use of xed-term versus permanent workers at
the rm-level, and the probability of being hired with a xed-term (temporary) contract
following the crisis, by exploiting di¤erences across industries in external nancial needs.
The main contribution of this paper is to study how nancing constraints a¤ect the
decision to hire xed-term workers in response to nancial shocks. This is an important
issue given existing evidence that the increased use of xed-term employment contracts
increases overall employment volatility and a¤ects wages, labour mobility and investment
in human capital (Dolado et al., 2002).
A branch of the literature has studied the interaction between xed-term and perman-
ent employment contracts, and the e¤ects of xed-term contract availability on unemploy-
ment. Focussing particularly on European countries, where reforms to labor laws that
regulate xed-term contracts permitted such studies, empirical research has found that
xed-term employment absorbs a higher share of output volatility and increases overall
employment volatility, while the e¤ects on unemployment are ambiguous (see e.g., Dolado
et al., 2002; Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Kugler and Pica,
2004).
However, these studies do not address the potential e¤ects of nancing constraints on
the use of xed-term contracts by rms. As such, our paper is more closely related to, and
complements results in Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who study the interaction between
nancing constraints and the employment decisions of rms that can chose between xed-
term and permanent workers. The authors develop a model that shows that nancing
constraints are important in determining the optimal mix between xed-term and per-
manent workers, and test this empirically using survey data for a sample of small and
medium Italian manufacturing rms from 1995 to 2000. Their measures of nancing
constraints are constructed from answers to survey questions about whether the rm (1)
had a loan application turned down recently, (2) desires more credit at the market in-
terest rate, and (3) would be willing to pay a higher interest rate than the market rate to
obtain credit. We instead exploit the crisis of 2008-09 as a quasi-experiment to identify
the e¤ects of an exogenous shock that a¤ected rms nancing conditions on the intensity
of xed-term contracts, and we use the population of private sectors rms for analysis.
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Our paper is also related to studies on the e¤ect of nancial imperfections on rms
labour demand. Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), using UK data nd that increased nancial
pressure has a large negative e¤ect on employment and pay rises. Smolny and Winker
(1999) report consistent evidence for Germany, that nancing constraints reduce employ-
ment and increase employment volatility. Benito and Hernando (2003) show that demand
for xed-term employment is less persistent, more sensitive to wage costs and to nancial
factors.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate how the global nancial crisis of 2008-09, and the subsequent nancing
constraints, a¤ect employment decisions of rms when it is possible to choose between
temporary and permanent contracts when hiring a worker. The main data source used in
this paper is the Portuguese linked employer employee data Quadros de Pessoal (QP), for
the period 2002 through 2012. These data have been collected annually since the 1980s
by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The data include information
on all private sector rms that employ at least one wage earner, and on all of their plants
and all of their employees. Firms are required by law to answer the survey and to have it
publicly available at the workplace. This ensures a high degree of coverage and reliability
of the data. The data contains information on 4959547 unique workers and 492623 unique
rms, which we trace over time using their unique registration number.
Information on workers includes, for example, the type of contract of employment
(xed-term or permanent), hiring date in the rm, date of last promotion, monthly
hours of work (normal and overtime), earnings, gender, age, schooling, level of skill, and
occupation. The variable "Type of contract of employment" allows us to identify whether
each worker is employed with a permanent or with a xed-term employment contract;
this variable has been collected since 2000. A permanent contract of employment means
that the employment relation has no denite duration, that is, the employment contract
is open-ended. Fixed-term employment contracts are intended by law to fulll rms
temporary work needs and hence the timing to the end of the employment relation is
specied in the contract when the worker is hired.5 We use the terms temporary and
5Also, by law, xed-term employment contracts cannot exceed three years of duration; and can be
renewed, at most, three times. If these limits are reached, the rm would need to either layo¤ the workers
or move them to an open-ended contract. The rationale for this is that if a worker is employed for over
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xed-term interchangeably throughout the paper.
Firm level data include, for example, the year of creation, industry, region, total
number of workers, number of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership
type (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign). Our analysis includes
only rms operating in the manufacturing and services sectors.
We merge the matched employer-employee data with measures of nancial dependence
of the sector the rm belongs to, calculated over the period prior to the crisis. Data to
compute these measures is from rmsbalance sheets from Sistema de Contas Integradas
das Empresas (Enterprise Integrated Accounts System, SCIE). This data is collected by
the Portuguese O¢ ce for National Statistics (INE) and covers the universe of rms in
manufacturing and services since 2004. Before starting to collect the SCIE data, the INE
implemented the Inquérito à Empresa Harmonizado (Harmonized Business Survey, IEH),
a representative annual survey covering around 40 000 rms. Together, the SCIE and the
IEH provide detailed balance sheet data for rms which we use to construct measures of
nancial vulnerability, described in more detail below.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the rms in our sample, in each year. As shown,
xed-term contracts represent a signicant share of total employment within rms in the
Portuguese labor market, averaging 15 percent over the period (column 2). As discussed
in Portugal and Varejão (2009), in 2003 Portugal had the second largest share of xed-
term employment of the 15 members of the European Union, second only to that of Spain.
In a related study about the use of xed-term contracts, Caggese and Cuñat (2008) report
a signicantly lower average share of xed-term workers at the rm-level in Italy, of 4
percent. Table 1 also shows that the proportion of xed term employment increased
during the crisis, and in 2009 it exceeded 17 percent of total employment. Although the
share of xed-term employment decreased in 2010, it started to increase again from 2011
onwards.
To investigate whether there is a di¤erential use of xed-term workers for nancially
constrained rms after the crisis, the main dependent variables in our specications are
the share of xed-term workers in total employment at the rm-year level and, alternat-
ively, the ratio of xed-term workers over permanent workers, conditional on the existence
three years at the rm, the rms requirement would be for a permanent rather than for a temporary
worker.
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of permanent workers within the rm. In some of our specications, we focus on the share
of hires with xed-term contracts in total number of workers hired in each year at the
rm-level. We identify the permanent and xed-term hires by combining information on
the workers"type of contract of employment" and the "hiring date" of the worker in the
rm. For each rm-year we compute the number of new hires with temporary employ-
ment contracts and those with permanent employment contracts. We then obtain the
ratio of xed-term hires over total hires, and the ratio of xed-term hires over permanent
hires. As shown in Table 1, the share of hires with xed-term contract in total hires
(column 4) averaged 51 percent within rms across the years.
To analyze the e¤ects of the crisis, we identify the global nancial crisis period by
dening a binary variable, Dcrisis, that takes the value of 1 from 2008 onwards and
zero otherwise. September 2008 has been considered in other studies as the month when
the crisis started since it was marked by several major nancial institution failures and
bailouts, including Lehman Brothers and AIG, that triggered a sharp escalation in the
global credit crunch (see e.g. Chor and Manova, 2011). In September 2008 Lehman
Brothers led for bankruptcy after not being able to obtain short-term nancing or to
nd a buyer. The cost of interbank lending soared immediately (see Chodorow-Reich,
2014, for more details).
3.1.1 Measures of external nance dependence, asset tangibility and trade
credit
We require measures of nancial dependence to identify di¤erential e¤ects for nancially
constrained rms. In our empirical strategy we exploit di¤erences in the sensitivity to
credit availability across sectors and use the global nancial crisis of 2008-2009 as a shock
to credit supply. Previous research has shown that some sectors are more vulnerable to
external nance than others. Two reasons are usually pointed for this. First, rms in some
sectors have substantially larger liquidity needs, for example, because of the initial project
scale, the requirement for continuing investment, or the cash harvest period (Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). Second, rms in sectors that are intrinsically associated with more
tangible (harder) assets can borrow more easily (Braun, 2003). As discussed in Rajan
and Zingales (1998), the technological di¤erences across industries in their dependence
on external nance reect intrinsic properties of the sectors and persist across countries.
Fisman and Love (2003) further highlight the importance of trade credit as an alternative
source of funds to borrowing from nancial institutions. The amount of trade credit that
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rms obtain from their suppliers captures the importance of trade credit in the nancing
of economic activity.
We construct industry measures of nancial vulnerability based on data for Portuguese
rms for the period between 1997 and 2006. To construct these measures we use the SCIE
and the IEH balance sheet data, for the period that precedes the crisis so that the e¤ect
of the nancial crisis on rm behavior does not contaminate the measures of the sectors
nancial vulnerability. We use common proxies for the nancial vulnerability of sectors:
external nance dependence and asset tangibility; and a third measure for the importance
of trade credit. We follow the literature in computing the measures of tangibility and
liquidity. We rst calculate nancial vulnerability at the rm level as an average measure
over the 1997-2006 period, for all rms in the SCIE/IEH data. We then use the median
value across all rms within a 2-digit ISIC rev 3.1 sector as the sectors measure of external
nancial dependence (extn), tangible assets (tang) and trade credit (tcred).6
External nancial dependence (extn) is measured by the share of total capital ex-
penditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. This measure re-
ects the rmsdependence on external nance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The measure
of trade credit (tcred) is the ratio of total accounts payable over total cost of goods sold,
following Love et al. (2007).7 This measure reects access to client-supplier credit, the
credit rms receive from their suppliers instead of making up-front payments for supplies
(Fisman and Love, 2003). This type of credit reects short-term operating requirements
of credit and could have acted as an alternative to credit obtained from nancial institu-
tions during the nancial crisis. Fisman and Love (2003) show that industries with higher
dependence on trade credit nancing have higher growth rates in countries with weaker
nancial institutions, suggesting that trade credit may provide an alternative source to
bank credit.
The measure of asset tangibility (tang) is computed as the share of net plant, prop-
erty and equipment in total book-value assets. This measure reects rmsability to
use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external nance (Braun, 2003; Claessens and
Laeven, 2003). These industry measures are widely regarded as technologically determ-
ined characteristics of a sector, intrinsic to the sector and exogenous for a particular rm.
6We also calculate the same measures restricting the analysis to the period 2004-2006 when the SCIE
data covers the universe of rms. Results remain robust for these alternative measures. As discussed
in the literature, these measures tend to be stable over time, and to show much larger variation across
industries than across rms within a given industry.
7This measure is computed over 2006-2007 because the data distinguishes rms credit obtained
exclusively from suppliers only since 2006.
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Table A2 shows summary statistics for these measures.
3.2 Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between nancing constraints and the employment decisions
of rms with respect to the use xed-term and permanent employment contracts, we
implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. The aim is to investigate whether rms
in sectors with high dependence on external nance increase their use of xed-term con-
tracts disproportionately after the crisis, relative to rms in sectors with low nancial
vulnerability, since the nancial crises reduced the availability of external credit to rms.
Hence, we estimate specications of the form:
Yjst = 1Dcrisist  FINs + 2Dcrisist + 3FINs + X 0jt + d(:) + jst: (1)
where the dependent variable, Yjst, is one of the rm outcomes, such as employment level
or volatility and, most importantly, the measures of xed term-contract intensity: the
share of xed-term employment in total or permanent employment in rm j, industry
s and year t. Dcrisist is an indicator that takes the value 1 on and after 2008, and 0
otherwise. September 2008 is generally considered as the onset of the crisis. In July 2007
the interbank market interest rate increased following the announcement by the French
bank BNP Paribas of the freezing of three investment funds based on impossibility to
value its subprime assets. Other banks followed in freezing their subprime portfolios. In
March 2008, the withdrawal of short-term nancing to Bear Stearns lead to its sale to
J.P. Morgan. Financial conditions then stabilized temporarily, but worsened severely in
September 2008 with Lehman Brothersreports of losses and subsequent bankruptcy after
not being able to obtain short-term nancing or to nd a buyer. The cost of interbank
lending soared as a result (see Chodorow-Reich, 2014, for details).
FINs is one of the measures of nancial dependence for industry s, external nance
dependence (extfin), access to trade credit (tcred), and collateralizable assets (tang),
respectively. In addition to the continuous industry measures of nancial dependence,
FINs, in alternative specications we use dummy variables that take the value of 1 for
industry s, if that industry is above the median for the respective FIN measure and zero
otherwise, IFINsabove med. The strategy of dividing sectors in two groups, one with below-
median sectors in terms of the measures of nancial dependence, and the other with
above-median sectors in those measures, has been employed in other existing studies (see
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e.g. Giroud and Mueller, 2014; Duygan-Bump et al., 2015). In those specications, the
coe¢ cient 1 is interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis for rms in industries
above the median of nancial dependence relative to rms in industries below the median.
X 0jt is a vector containing rm characteristics, such as the lagged log value of sales
(in real terms), the legal structure, whether the rm is an exporter, foreign-owned, or
multiplant. We also include a set of xed e¤ects d(:) to control for general trends, for
region and industry xed e¤ects or, in alternative to industry, for rm time-invariant
characteristics. The stand-alone variable FINs is absorbed by industry characteristics
and is not included when industry xed e¤ects are controlled for. Similarly, the stand-
alone crisis dummy variable, Dcrisist, is absorbed by year xed e¤ects, and thus not
included when we control for year xed e¤ects. jst is a random disturbance term.
In all empirical specications, standard errors are clustered by industry. Given the
xed e¤ects included, the coe¢ cient of interest, on the interaction between the crisis
dummy and the nancial dependence measures, Dcrisist  FINs, is interpreted as the
di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the intensity of xed-term contracts for rms in sec-
tors with high, or above-median external nancial dependence, relative to rms in other
sectors. We expect the sign of the coe¢ cient to be positive for extn, and negative for
tcred since rms in sectors that rely more on client-supplier (trade) credit could have
used trade credit as an alternative to formal credit from nancial institutions, alleviating
the e¤ects on xed-term employment. The sign of the coe¢ cient on tang is expected to
be negative if rms are able to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external nance
during the crisis.
We also use worker-level data to investigate whether workers hired in the period of
analysis in rms within industries with higher nancial vulnerability were more likely to
be hired with a temporary contract after the crisis, relative to workers hired by rms in
industries with lower nancial dependence. For that purpose, using the sample of workers
that were hired during our sample period, we estimate a linear probability model for the
probability of a worker being hired with a temporary employment contract.8 We estimate
the following specication:
Pr[fixed_termijst] = 1DcrisistFINs+2Dcrisist+3FINs+X 0jt+Z 0it+d(:)+ijst:
(2)
where the dependent variable Pr[fixed_termijst] is the probability of being hired with a
8Results remain robust to using a probit for estimation.
13
temporary contract, so fixed_termijst = 1 if worker i was hired by rm j (in industry
s) in year t as a temporary worker (with a xed-term contract), and zero if hired with a
permanent contract. Zit is a vector of worker (i) characteristics, including the workers
gender, age (and its square), level of education attained, potential labor market experi-
ence (and its square), level of skill, and occupation. Xjt is a vector of rm characteristics
as before. We also include a set of xed e¤ects d(:) that control for time, region, rm or
industry characteristics. The variables Dcrisist and FINs are as dened as above. The
coe¢ cient of interest, on the interaction term Dcrisist  FINs measures the di¤erential
e¤ect on the probability of being hired with a xed-term contract for workers in indus-
tries with higher (or above-median) nancial dependence, relative to workers in other
industries, after the 2008-09 crisis, controlling for all workers and rms characteristics.
4 Results
4.1 E¤ect of the crisis on rm total employment
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the 2008-09 crisis on average total employment and
employment volatility. We regress the log of employment and a measure of employment
volatility at the rm-year level, respectively, on the crisis dummy variable, Dcrisist.
We control for region characteristics that may a¤ect employment across rms, and for
industry or rm xed e¤ects to absorb any systematic di¤erences across industries or
rms that may a¤ect employment outcomes. Results reported in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 2 show that rm level employment declined after the crisis, within rms and across
rms within an industry. These results are consistent with other studies that document
overall employment decreases after the crisis (e.g. Greenstone et al., 2014). In columns
(3) and (4) we investigate the e¤ect on employment volatility. We regress the coe¢ cient
of variation of total employment at the rm-level, calculated over a ve year window for
the periods pre- and post-crisis, for 2003-2007 and 2008-2012, on the Dcrisist variable
and the same sets of xed e¤ects. Results show that after controlling for rm unobserved
characteristics, the volatility of total employment increases, on average, after the crisis.
[Table 2 about here]
Next, we assess if there are di¤erential employment e¤ects for rms in sectors with
intrinsically higher external nancial needs, lower dependence on buyer-supplier trade
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credit, or lower shares of collateralizable assets. We estimate a specication similar
to Eq. (1) with the same employment dependent variables as in Table 2. Results are
reported in Table 3. Odd columns report results using the continuous measures of nancial
dependence across sectors, and even columns use the indicator variable for whether the
sector is above the median for the correspondent measure of nancial vulnerability. All
columns include region, year and rm xed e¤ects, thus controlling for any systematic
di¤erences across rms in the treatment and control groups, and for region characteristics
and global trends. The coe¢ cient of interest is now that on the interaction Dcrisist 
FINs, which estimates the di¤erential, if any, in terms of employment outcomes for rms
in sectors with higher nancial dependence, relative to rms in sectors with lower nancial
vulnerability. The lower order terms of the interaction are absorbed by the xed e¤ects
included.
We do not obtain signicantly di¤erent e¤ects of the crisis in terms of employment
level (Panel A) or volatility (Panel B) for rms that rely more on external nance or have
less access to credit from suppliers.9 An hypothesis to explain this result is that, in a labor
market with strict employment protection legislation for permanent workers and where
xed-term contracts are available with low ring costs, rms in more nancially dependent
sectors might have used xed-term contracts as a exible device to adjust employment.
As a result, overall employment e¤ects of the crisis would have been less pronounced. For
example, rms might have been more willing to hire workers after the crisis, e.g. those
who became unemployed due to the termination of permanent or temporary contracts
in their previous job, because they could o¤er them a xed-term contract and retain the
exibility to lay them o¤ with lower costs. We nd that rms in sectors with tangible
asset shares above the median experienced a signicantly larger drop in employment and
increased employment volatility after the crisis, relative to rms in sectors with lower
shares of tangible assets. In the next sections we investigate di¤erential e¤ects of the
crisis on the use of xed-term employment across rms based on their sectorial external
nancial dependence.
[Table 3 about here]
9We obtain a signicant coe¢ cient in column (3) but it is positive rather than negative.
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4.2 E¤ect of the crisis on xed-term employment: rm-level
This section presents the main results of the paper. We are interested in identifying how
nancial constraints a¤ected rmsdecisions to hire xed-term versus permanent workers
after the crisis, and thus the share of xed term employment and hires within rms. We
estimate Eq. (1) and use two alternative dependent variables to measure the intensity of
xed-term employment contracts within rms: the share of xed-term workers in total
employment, and the ratio of xed-term to permanent employment. We estimate spe-
cication (1) by OLS, but results remain robust to using Tobit for estimation. The results
are reported in Panels A and B of Table 4, respectively. Given the di¤erence-in-di¤erence
identication approach, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the crisis dummy
and the measure of nancial dependence, DcrisistFINs, identies how rms in sectors
that are intrinsically more dependent on external nance, or that have wider access to
buyer-supplier credit prior to crisis change the share of xed-term employment after the
shock, relative to rms in sectors with lower external nance needs. Odd columns report
results when using the continuous measures of FINs, described in section 3.1.1, while
even columns use the dummy variable for whether the sector is above the median in terms
of the corresponding measure of nancial dependence, IFinV ulnabove_med.
We report results that control for year xed-e¤ects and thus do not include the stand-
alone dummy for the crisis period, and for region xed e¤ects, to control for any regional
characteristics that might a¤ect the share of xed-term employment for all rms. We
also control for industry or rm unobserved characteristics alternatively in the columns
of the Table, and always include as controls the rms log sales in the previous year, and
dummies for rm ownership, legal structure and multiestablishement. Standard errors
are always clustered by industry.
[Table 4 about here]
The results reported in Panel A of Table 4 show that the coe¢ cient on the Dcrisist
FINs interaction is positive and statistically signicant for the measure of dependence on
external nance. Firms in sectors with substantially larger liquidity needs, in particular
those above the median value across sectors, increased the share of xed-term employment
after the crisis, relative to rms operating in sectors with external nancial needs below
the median. This result is obtained both across rms within a sector and within rms,
after the onset of the nancial crisis. The e¤ect is also economically sizeable. In particular,
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controlling for rm characteristics, the coe¢ cient in column 4 represents an increase
of 0.6 percentage points, corresponding to a 4 percent increase relative to the sample
mean of 15 percent, in the share of xed-term employment for rms above the median
dependence on external nance after the crisis, relative to rms in sectors with external
nance dependence below the median. Results reported in Panel B use the ratio of xed
to permanent employment, and are thus restricted to a sample of rms that employ
both types of workers. Results remain consistent although the signicance level of the
coe¢ cients is smaller.
The nding that rms with more nancing constraints increase the share of temporary
workers following the crisis, suggests that to deal with increased uncertainty and expect-
ation of further nancing constraints, rms use xed-term workers more intensively, as
they o¤er greater exibility to adjust employment in the face of negative shocks, given
the lower ring costs associated with this type of contracts.
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 4, use the importance of buyer-supplier (trade)
credit as the (inverse) measure of FINs. When we use our preferred measure, the dummy
variable to separate rms into the two bins of above- or below-median of the sector
measure of nancial dependence, the estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction Dcrisist 
IFINsabove med, is negative and statistically signicant. This result suggests that rms in
industries that rely more on credit from suppliers experienced a lower e¤ect of the crisis on
the intensity of xed-term employment relative to rms with below-median access to trade
credit. An hypothesis to explain this result is that access to trade credit was used as an
alternative source of funds to credit from nancial institutions. Firms with access to this
type of credit would experience lower e¤ects as they need not seek the additional exibility
from xed-term workers, given that they are likely to be relatively less productive than
permanent workers (Caggege and Cuñat, 2008). Results remain robust when we use
as dependent variable the ratio of xed to permanent workers (Panel B). In columns
(9)-(12) we consider sectors intrinsically associated with more tangible (harder) assets,
relative to those with lower endowment of tangible assets (tang) as the (inverse) proxy for
nancial vulnerability. We do not nd statistically signicant di¤erences in terms of the
mix between xed-term and permanent employment for rms in above-median sectors in
terms of tangibility of assets, relative to those in below-median sectors.
In Table 5, we investigate whether rms that are more nancially dependent before
the crisis hire a larger proportion of xed-term workers after the crisis, relative to rms
with lower nancial vulnerability. To that end, we estimate Eq. (1) but using information
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on the new hires within each rm-year, that is, the dependent variable is now the ratio
of new workers hired with a xed-term contract over the total number of new workers
hired by the rm each year. This allows us to test the hypothesis that rms in more
nancially vulnerable sectors hire a larger fraction of xed-term workers after the crisis
than rms in sectors with lower nancial vulnerability. This also avoids the potential
issue of employment shares being a¤ected by the dismissal rate at the rms during the
crisis. Table A1 reports summary statistics for new worker hires in each year during our
sample period. Around half a million workers were hired each year, on average, during
the period, and around 58 percent of new hires, on average, were employed with a xed-
term contract. We want to investigate the role of nancial vulnerability in the intensity
of xed-term hiring contracts after the crisis. The results are conditional on rms hiring
xed-term workers in the periods before and after the crisis. We continue to include the
same sets of controls and xed e¤ects as above.
The estimates obtained for the sample of hires, using the sector-level measure of
external nancial dependence (extn), are reported in columns (1) through (4) of Table 5.
We continue to obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction
term between the nancial dependence measure and the post crisis dummy, Dcrisist 
FINs, for both the continuos measure and the dummy that separates rms in the two
bins of above- and below-median of nancial vulnerability. That is, we nd that after
the crisis rms with high dependence on external nance increase the share of hires with
xed-term contract in total hires disproportionately, relative to rms with below-median
dependence. This result is obtained when controlling for rm xed e¤ects, thus absorbing
any di¤erential hiring preferences and policies of rms, as well as other unobserved rm
characteristics. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is also economically sizeable, implying
a di¤erential increase of 1.4 percentage points, corresponding to a 3 percent increase
relative to the sample mean of 51 percent in the share of xed-term hires, for rms in the
above-median group relative to those in the control group (column 4).
The remaining columns of the table report results for the measures of trade credit and
asset tangibility to proxy for FINs. We do not nd evidence of di¤erential e¤ects of the
crisis for rms ranked by these measures in terms of the share of temporary employment
contracts for new hired workers by rms. Although for trade credit the coe¢ cients are
still negative, they are now statistically insignicant.
[Table 5 about here]
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In sum, our results are consistent with the interpretation that nancing constraints
played a role in the decisions of rms to hire xed-term workers after the crisis. We
nd robust evidence that rms in sectors with above-median dependence on external
nance increased the share of xed-term employment contracts after the crisis. Our
results have important policy implications given that empirical research has found that
xed-term workers tend to earn lower wages and jump from one contract to another with
repeated spells on unemployment. These contracts have been shown to a¤ect mostly
young, women or poorly educated workers (see e.g. Portugal and Varejão, 2009; Bentolila
and Dolado, 1994). The nding that the use of this type of contracts increased after the
crisis uncovers a new cost of the shock with potential long-term e¤ects in terms of exposure
to labor market frictions and decrease in the accumulation of human capital for temporary
workers. This is particularly relevant in European labor markets, characterized by a dual
structure where workers in open-ended contracts are highly protected, while those in
temporary contracts are subject to mild dismissal regulations.
4.3 E¤ect of the crisis on xed-term employment: worker-level
In this section we exploit worker-level information, and investigate whether workers hired
in the period of analysis in rms within industries characterized by intrinsically higher
nancial vulnerability were more likely to be hired with a temporary contract after the
crisis, relative to workers hired in industries with low dependence on external funding. For
that purpose, we use the sample of workers that were hired during the period of analysis,
and estimate a model for the probability of a worker being hired with a temporary
employment contract.10 We estimate Eq. (2), where the dependent variable takes the
value of 1 if the worker was hired with a temporary contract in year t, and zero if hired
with a permanent contract. We obtain OLS estimates, since we include rm xed e¤ects,
along with region, and year xed e¤ects, given concerns of biases resulting from nonlinear
estimates with xed-e¤ects. In alternative specications, without rm xed e¤ects, we
obtain similar estimates when using Probit for estimation. Our estimates control for the
same rm-level variables as before, and additionally for worker characteristics, gender,
age, experience and their squares, education level and skill level.
In the columns of Table 6, we report results for the same three measures of nancial
vulnerability: external nance dependence (extn), access to supplier credit (tcred) and
10The QP employer-employee data does not trace workers from unemployment into employment, and
so only rm to rm transitions can be analysed.
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asset tangibility (tang). The coe¢ cients on the interaction between the post-2008 dummy
and the measures of nancial vulnerability are positive and statistically signicant for
extn, and show that controlling for workersobserved characteristics, workers hired by
rms within industries with above-median external nance dependence are more likely
to be employed with a temporary contract after the crisis, relative to workers hired by
rms with below-median dependence on external nance. The point estimate of 0.037 in
column (2) means that the relative impact of the recession was to increase the probability
of a xed-term contract by 3.7 percentage points for workers in industries with above-
median dependence on external funds.
[Table 6 about here]
Columns (3) and (4) report results that show that workers hired in industries that
have wider access to credit from suppliers were less likely to be hired on a temporary basis,
after the crisis, relative to workers hired by rms in industries with below-median access to
trade credit. As discussed above, and consistent with studies that nd that access to trade
credit may be an alternative source of funds to credit from nancial institutions (Fisman
and Love, 2003), these results suggest that rms in industries that have credit extended
by their upstream suppliers instead of having to make spot payments for supplies had less
need to rely on xed-term workers when hiring. This evidence suggests that trade credit
can o¤er rms a substitute for formal bank loans and alleviate the need to use xed-
term contracts to gain exibility to adjust employment in the future. For the tangibility
measures, we nd positive and signicant coe¢ cients on the probability of temporary
employment contract.
4.4 Robustness checks
Our results reported in the previous sections show that nancing constrains a¤ect em-
ployment decisions and the mix between xed-term and permanent workers in the rm.
In particular, following the 2008-09 crisis, rms in sectors with higher external nance
dependence increased the use of xed-term employment contracts, potentially to increase
exibility to adjust employment when facing liquidity stocks. Results are thus consistent
with the role of shocks to credit supply. To provide additional evidence that our results
are driven by di¤erential nancial dependence across industries, we follow Duygan-Bump
et al. (2015), and perform similar analysis to that reported in previous sections, but using
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the 2001 recession, which was triggered by the bursting of the bubble in the information
and communications technology (ICT) sector, and did not originate in nancial markets.
The 2001 recession did not a¤ect rms access to credit, as the current crisis did, and
it serves as a placebo test of our main results if changes in the use of xed-term employ-
ment are not related to the dependence of external nance across industries. Therefore,
we should nd no signicant di¤erential e¤ects for rms in industries with di¤erent levels
of external nance dependence or access to trade credit, relative to rms in other sec-
tors after the 2001 crisis. That is, we expect the coe¢ cient on the interaction term
Dcrisist  FINs to be statistically insignicant for the 2001, ICT-driven crisis. We es-
timate specications similar to Eq. (1), but the post-shock dummy, Dcrisist, is now
dened for the period after the 2001 crisis. The Quadros de Pessoal matched employer-
employee data was not collected in 2001, and the variable that distinguishes the workers
contract of employment, whether xed-term or permanent, was only introduced since
2000, as such we are restricted to using the period from 2000 for the placebo test, and
dene the Dcrisis2001t to take the value of 1 for the years after the 2001 crisis, and zero
for 2000.
Results at the rm-level are reported in Table 7. We estimate a specication similar
to that reported in Table 4, controlling for the same covariates and xed e¤ects but for
the 2001 crisis. As shown, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the Post-2001
dummy and the measures of nancial dependence are statistically insignicant, showing
that nancing constraints are insignicant in explaining employment mix following the
2001 crisis. This provides additional support to our main results, for the 2008-09 nancial
crisis.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 8 reports results at the worker-level, where, similar to the results reported in
Table 6, we regress the probability of a worker being hired with a xed term contract on
the Dcrisis2001t  FINs interaction term and all the worker- and rm-level controls and
xed e¤ects, as discussed above. Again, the coe¢ cient on the main variable of interest is
not statistically signicant for all three proxies for nancial vulnerability (or its inverse).
This provides further support for the role of nancing constraints in the decision of rms
to hire xed-term versus temporary workers.
[Table 8 about here]
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the nancial crisis of 2008-09, and the resulting nancing
constraints imposed on rms, a¤ects rms decisions in terms of employment composition,
when temporary and permanent contracts are available when hiring a worker. Labor
market responses to the crisis have been large in European labor markets, characterized
by strict employment protection for regular contracts and by exible temporary contracts.
However, evidence on the e¤ects of nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent
crisis, on rms decisions regarding the composition of employment, and the mix between
temporary and permanent workers is very scant.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers in
Portugal, and exploit the 2008-09 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to study the link
between nancing constraints and the intensity of xed-term workers within rms. We
also estimate at the worker level the e¤ects of nancing constraints on the probability
of being hired with a temporary contract after the crisis. Credit supply e¤ects are iden-
tied by industry-level measures of external nancial dependence, following Rajan and
Zingales (1998), computed over the period that precedes the crisis, to avoid changes in
rm behavior after the crisis to a¤ect the industry-level measures.
We nd that rms in industries with higher, or above-median, dependence on external
nance increased the share of xed-term employment and hires after the 2008-09 crisis,
relative to rms with lower, or below-median, external nancial needs. We account for
rmsunobserved characteristics, which absorb any systematic di¤erences across rms
and for aggregate trends. Firms in sectors with intrinsically higher access to buyer-
supplier credit exhibit relatively lower shares of xed-term employment and hires, relative
to other rms, after the crisis. This suggests that implicit borrowing in the form of
trade credit may have provided an alternative source of funds to credit from nancial
institutions during the crisis, and alleviate the need for increased exibility by hiring
temporary workers, which could be less productive. We also nd that workers are more
likely to be hired with a temporary contract if employed by rms in sectors with high
dependence on external nance, but less likely if hired by rms in industries with higher
access to credit from suppliers, controlling for workerscharacteristics.
Whilst our ndings are based on micro-level data, they have a broader relevance
and policy implications. Financial constraints and the availability of credit have been
shown to be important determinants of rmsemployment decisions, and can potentially
magnify employment volatility over the business cycle. Empirical research has also found
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that increased use of xed-term workers tends to increase employment volatility, decrease
wages of temporary workers, and reduce labor mobility. Our ndings suggest that rms
increase the use of temporary contracts following the crisis, as a way to increase exibility
to adjust employment in the face of negative shocks, given the lower ring costs associated
with this type of contracts. They uncover a new cost of the crisis, with potential longer-
term e¤ects in terms of increasingly segmented labour markets, increased employment
volatility, higher exposure to labor market frictions and decrease in the accumulation of
human capital and labor productivity.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, employment shares
All rms Hiring Firms
Year Nb. rms FoT FoP FoTH FoPH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2003 196,646 0.127 0.315 0.450 0.838
2004 211,850 0.135 0.342 0.474 0.981
2005 222,544 0.144 0.355 0.484 1.100
2006 232,934 0.147 0.373 0.497 1.178
2007 237,098 0.163 0.423 0.525 1.306
2008 244,546 0.170 0.439 0.551 1.402
2009 246,877 0.172 0.433 0.558 1.188
2010 204,716 0.128 0.294 0.476 0.864
2011 219,888 0.139 0.322 0.524 0.964
2012 211,797 0.144 0.330 0.547 0.903
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS
(2002-2012). FoT is the share of Fixed-term over total
employment; FoP is the share of Fixed-term over perman-
ent employment. FoTH, FoPH relate to the same shares
within the sample of hires. Table reports averages across
rms.
Table 2: E¤ect of the crisis on employment and employment volatility
Dependent variable: ln(employment)jt CV(employment)jt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis -0.047*** -0.069*** -0.001 0.007***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002)
Additional controls multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Region FE yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
R2 0.567 0.094 0.010 0.005
Nb. Obs. 2,263,084 2,263,084 734,514 734,514
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012 and zero otherwise. The depend-
ent variable is the ln of employment in cols (1) and (2) and the employment
coe¢ cient of variation at the rm level in columns (3) and (4). Two coef-
cients were computed for each rm, for the periods before and after the
nancial crisis. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry
level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: E¤ect of the crisis and of nancial vulnerability on employment level and volat-
ility
Dependent variable: Panel A: ln(employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV uln -0.002 0.009*** -0.055*
(0.026) (0.003) (0.030)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.019 -0.007 -0.051**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.022)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.103
Nb. Obs. 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896
Dependent variable: Panel B: CV(employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV uln 0.002 0.001 0.024***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.002 0.007* 0.019***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Additional controls multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
Nb. Obs. 720,078 720,078 720,078 720,078 720,078 720,078
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. Financial vulnerability measures are
calculated over 1997-2006, pre-dating the crisis. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance
and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations.
TCRED measures acess to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost of goods
sold. TANG measures tangible assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total
book-value assets. IFinV ulnabove_med takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding
FinVul measure, and zero otherwise. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level,
are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term employment contracts; rm-level
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term employment/Total employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crisis FinV uln 0.010** 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.012*** 0.006** -0.009** -0.007** -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes Yes Yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.043 0.043 0.013 0.013 0.043 0.043 0.013 0.013 0.043 0.043 0.013 0.013
Nb. Obs. 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896 2,228,896
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term employment/Permanent employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crisis FinV uln 0.017 0.002 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 0.017
(0.018) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.032) (0.036)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.051** 0.046* -0.051** -0.062** -0.003 0.018
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes ye yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes Yes yes yes
R2 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.001
Nb. Obs. 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534 1,821,534
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. Financial vulnerability measures are calculated over 1997-2006,
pre-dating the crisis. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is
not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. TCRED measures acess to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts
payable over cost of goods sold. TANG measures tangible assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total
book-value assets. IFinV ulnabove_med takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVul measure, and
zero otherwise. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 5: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires; rm-level
Dependent variable: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crisis FinV uln 0.020*** 0.013*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.017** 0.014** -0.009 -0.007 0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.068 0.068 0.011 0.011 0.068 0.068 0.011 0.011 0.068 0.068 0.011 0.011
Nb. Obs. 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025 771,025
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. Financial vulnerability measures are calculated over 1997-2006,
pre-dating the crisis. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is
not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. TCRED measures acess to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts
payable over cost of goods sold. TANG measures tangible assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total
book-value assets. IFinV ulnabove_med takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVul measure, and
zero otherwise. t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the crisis on the probability of xed-term hiring contract; worker-level
Dependent variable: Probability of xed-term hiring contractit (LPM)
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV uln 0.006 -0.012*** 0.049***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.015)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med 0.037** -0.042*** 0.046***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011)
Additional worker controls gender, age, age2, experience, experience2, education, skill-level
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035
Nb. Obs. 3,519,843 3,519,843 3,519,843 3,519,843 3,519,843 3,519,843
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. Fin. vulnerability measures calculated over
1997-2006, pre-dating the crisis. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of
total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. TCRED measures acess
to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost of goods sold. TANG measures tangible
assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-value assets. IFinV ulnabove_med takes
the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVul measure, and zero otherwise.
t statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: E¤ect of the 2001 crisis on the share of xed-term employment; rm-level
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term employment/Total employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crisis FinV uln 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.013 -0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med -0.001 0.002 0.008 0.005 -0.012* -0.005
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.045 0.045 0.016 0.016 0.045 0.045 0.016 0.016 0.045 0.046 0.016 0.016
Nb. Obs. 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280 334,280
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term employment/Permanent employment)jt
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Crisis FinV uln -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.016 -0.020
(0.019) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.036) (0.026)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med -0.002 0.008 0.020 0.006 -0.015 -0.019
(0.032) (0.019) (0.033) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002
Nb. Obs. 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793 271,793
Crisis takes the value of 1 in 2002 and 2003, and zero in 2000 (the data distinguishes between xed-term and permanent workers
contracts since 2000, and the data was not collected in 2001). Financial vulnerability measures are calculated over 1997-2006.
EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by
internal cash ows from operations. TCRED measures acess to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost
of goods sold. TANG measures tangible assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-value assets.
IFinV ulnabove_med takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVul measure, and zero otherwise. t
statistics, based on standard errors clustered at the industry level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Table 8: E¤ect of the 2001 crisis on the probability of xed-term hire; worker-level
Dependent variable: Probability of xed-term hiring contract
Fin. Vuln. measure: EXTFIN TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV uln -0.010 -0.001 0.034
(0.008) (0.004) (0.022)
Crisis IFinV ulnabove_med -0.003 0.022 0.021
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Additional worker controls gender, age, age2, experience, experience2, education, skill-level
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Nb. Obs. 463,325 463,325 463,325 463,325 463,325 463,325
Crisis takes the value of 1 in 2002 and 2003, and zero in 2000 (the data distinguishes between xed-term
and permanent workers contracts since 2000, and the data was not collected in 2001). Fin. vulnerability
measures calculated over 1997-2006. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share
of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. TCRED measures
acess to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost of goods sold. TANG measures
tangible assets and is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book-value assets. IFinV ulnabove_med
is a dummy=1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVul measure. t statistics, based on
standard errors clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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8 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics - overall hiring per year and share of xed term hires
Year Total hires % Fixed-term
2003 396,033 55.60
2004 419,740 58.05
2005 506,471 59.26
2006 532,082 59.72
2007 595,640 62.09
2008 617,153 65.10
2009 498,281 64.01
2010 474,961 51.39
2011 439,809 53.03
2012 331,042 54.94
Source: Own calculations based on Por-
tugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
Table A2: Descriptive statistics - rm level means
Dep. Var. FoT FoP FoTH FoPH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of dep var. 0.148 0.365 0.510 1.084
EXTFIN 0.532 0.517 0.508 0.495
TCRED 2.288 2.244 2.305 2.323
TANG 0.313 0.323 0.340 0.348
IEXTFINabove_med 0.501 0.489 0.476 0.459
ITCREDabove_med 0.459 0.454 0.484 0.494
ITANGabove_med 0.143 0.157 0.175 0.190
Crisis 0.506 0.506 0.488 0.470
ln(sales)t 1 11.983 12.144 12.677 12.672
Legal nature
individual name 0.212 0.218 0.138 0.138
uniperson quota society 0.038 0.035 0.037 0.039
anonynous society 0.036 0.042 0.071 0.073
singular person 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.004
other 0.025 0.028 0.036 0.032
Ownership
public 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
foreign 0.046 0.049 0.043 0.041
Multiplant 0.082 0.092 0.137 0.131
Nb. Obs. 2,228,896 1,821,534 771,025 450,948
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics - worker level
Covariate Mean
Fixed-term contract 0.626
EXTFIN 0.519
TCRED 3.003
TANG 0.324
IEXTFINabove_med 0.434
ITCREDabove_med 0.581
ITANGabove_med 0.159
Crisis 0.511
Female 0.447
Age 33.231
Experience 16.024
Educational level
seconday 0.288
high-school 0.246
university 0.122
Skill level
medium 0.328
high 0.139
ln(sales)t 1 14.784
Legal nature
individual name 0.048
uniperson quota society 0.026
anonynous society 0.286
singular person 0.001
other 0.048
Ownership
public 0.014
foreign 0.134
Multiplant 0.413
Nb. Obs. 3,519,843
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal,
MTSS (2002-2012).
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